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The Theory of Descriptions Revisited
ALBERTO PERUZZI*
An excursus is carried out through the principal steps in the development
of the theory of descriptions (TD) from B. Russell until now, and its most im-
portant advantages and disadvantages are sketched. TD is studied in the context
of model theory (in A. Robinson's style), taking preservation and classification
theorems based on normal forms into consideration. Finally, the categorical for-
mulation of TD in topos theory, starting from M. Fourman and D. Scott, is pre-
sented with reference to sheaves.
1 Introduction A 'descriptive' operator is a function Δ which, given an open
formula φ(x) of a language L as its input, gives an L-term Axφ(x), called a
'description', as its output. (In the following, L is supposed to be a standard
first-order language with identity.) Clearly, there are many such functions, and
to account for at least some of them is a project not only of mathematical sig-
nificance but also with extensive application to linguistics, because natural lan-
guages present a vast range of problems involving the articles "the" and "a"; the
theory of descriptions (TD) concerns set theory, with the abstraction operator
{ I . . . }, and recursion theory, from μ-operators to λ-terms. Here I shall limit
myself to a general consideration of definite descriptions, i.e. singular terms gen-
erated by Δ's which can be read "the such and such", denoted by \xφ(x).
The difficulties met within many contemporary attempts to formalize
descriptions lead to approaching the problem in an unusual way, based on the
intuition that the kernel of TD is the presence (or absence) of symmetries in a
universe of discourse, and therefore in semantics. So, given a model 3Dΐ for a the-
ory Γin L, we shall focus on the class AutA(W) of 9Dΐ-automorphisms point-
wise (for simplicity) fixed on a set A <Ξ 9ΐ, where W is a substructure of 9ΐ, in
order to classify descriptions obtained through parameters from A. As A is vary-
ing, this classification proves to be strictly related both to philosophical and
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mathematical questions: in such a context the spectrum from rigidity to com-
plete freedom for the reference of a given description provides a criterion for
testing the usefulness of ideas long discussed by logicians and linguists (e.g., the
distinctions between de dicto/de re and attributive/referential). Moreover, it is
striking how this usefulness depends on a program intended to generalize Galois
theory from fields to arbitrary structures (even outside algebra). But if one
wishes to study the phenomenology of symmetries of \xφ(x) one soon realizes
that one must bear in mind the morphisms and functors associated with different
concrete categories. Briefly, my slogan is: "once upon a time TD was a para-
digm of philosophy, today it is a chapter of model-theoretic algebra in the
categorial framework".
2 The landscape garden It is customary to say that (definite) description the-
ory begins with Bertrand Russell's "On denoting", first published in 1905. I shall
follow this custom. The characteristic feature of Russell's conception is that for
any </>, \xφ is an L-term which can be eliminated by a contextual definition in
the metalanguage:
ψ(\xφ(x)) =df iχ[vy(Φ(y) ++ x = y) Λ ψ(x)].
So, to say that the x such that φ has the property ψ is the same as saying that
there is one and only one x such that φ, and that one x has ψ. The aim of this
choice is to allow one to speak about everything that may not exist (in the
domain of interpretation) without having to widen the range of variables: onto-
logical parsimony. The first disadvantage is that any sentence like ψ(\xφ) is sim-
ply false if -i3xφ. The same, however, would be true for definitions in the object
language, replacing "=<//' with "<-•", while if we substitute the equivalence for
a weaker simple conditional, the critical case of a material implication with a
false premise (when there is not a unique φ but there are ψ's) must be explained:
a proposal is discussed in Section 6.5 of [12], but only has its value in criticism,
pointing to the fact that what we are interested in is not the particular form of
I -elimination, but the conditions of persistence for the truth of "there is exactly
one φ", formally 3lxφ, depending on the model-structure 21 and the local/global
character of terms in L. After all, to accept an implication from a false prem-
ise to a true consequence as conventionally true leads one nowhere, since knowl-
edge requires separation. (Eliminability of descriptions would be much more
revealing in a constructive logic.)
Another of Russell's problems originates from the interplay of | with nega-
tion. If -ι3ϊxφ (that is, the description is "improper") then we have to specify
the "scope" of the |-term; otherwise, ψ(\xφ) is false, but -ιψ(\xφ) is false too;
therefore, under classical (bivalent) semantics, \xφ is a contradictory entity. So
some qualification is needed. There are also problems concerning descriptions
in the context of so-called propositional attitudes, but these problems are not
so characteristic of descriptions as to be discussed here. Rather it should be
stressed how in Russell's treatment there are no constraints on the structural
dynamics which can lead, in the class of Γ-models, from 21 1= ~^3xφ to 2Γ H 3xφ
through a specified morphism/: 21 -> 2Γ. Russell's approach, like most of its later
variants, reveals apointlike view of descriptions. In contrast, let us suppose that
Γ-axioms codify the notion of a field and 21 is R, the field of real numbers,
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while φ means 'equal to V^ϊ'; then any such §Γ, like the field C of complex
numbers, will no longer be an ordered field. From this example one realizes that
becoming "proper", for a |-term, is strictly associated with structural proper-
ties of the models for L. Therefore TD is mathematically (and scientifically)
meaningful, only with reference to a class K of structures, which behave as onto-
logical background, and to a theory T (or a 'bunch' of theories) acting as a
"Gestalt-selector" on K\ Γand K are parameters for the variation of a certain
kind of definability.
With this project in mind, I shall also criticize some common alternatives
to Russell's solution as merely formal and ad hoc, with respect to the real, pro-
found, problems of TD. It is in this spirit that I consider puzzles such as the fol-
lowing: suppose Vxφ holds, then by the axiom Vxφ -> φ(t), if there are no
constraints on the formation of | -terms, we get for / = \x~^φ the consequence
φ(|χ-ιφ), and by |-definition 3lx(->φ(x) Λ Φ(X)): a contradiction. Do logical
rules no longer preserve truth? No, I can simply say that the premises were
incompatible. Another example: given φ(y) = 3x(y Φ x), let us form \yφ; while
φ is consistent, any sentence containing such a term is not. One can understand
how natural it might be to exclude such possibilities, constraining the formation
of I -terms on storaged information in T. It is just the proof-theoretic approach
to TD which comes next, the first version of which was presented by Hubert and
Bernays in [7]. Their basic idea was the introduction of | -terms with conditional
axioms or rules such as
T\-3lxφ(x)
\xφ is a new term and φ(\xφ) a new axiom added to T.
There are many formal variants of such a style. The main advantage of this
approach is the (constructive, if desired) control of the use of |. The other side
of the coin is, as Carnap stated in [3], that the notion of a term is no longer re-
cursive, but at most recursively enumerable. To make virtue of necessity, one
might reply: it is simply a dogma that the expressive resources of a language L
cannot depend on results obtained by theories for which L is designed. I con-
fess that I agree, in this case, with the acknowledgment of the factually insepara-
ble interplay of definability and theoremhood as a nonlinear process, but what
has again to be explained is our policy when TV V.xφ and TV ->3!xφ. Does
the term \xφ belong to a new Lymbus? If such an interplay as a heuristic schema
is adopted, a positive theory of the constraints on the variability of reference
for I-terms in Γ-models must be worked out.
A different approach is exemplified in the proposal presented in [3]. It is
the conventional solution: identify the value of \xφ in a model 9ft with an ar-
bitrary but fixed and uniformly assigned element in the domain of 3Dΐ, when
-i 3 Ixφ. It effectively relies on a certain practice in mathematical reasoning, espe-
cially when one gives a definition by the cases of a function. Sometimes, how-
ever, it is preferable to leave a function undefined; for example take/: 1R -> 1R
which for input x gives the inverse 1/x; /is not defined at the argument 0, so
in order to let/be total on IR one might choose an arbitrary value for 1/0, but
this is not done. A symmetric situation occurs with the recursive definition of
the factorial (we put (0)! = 1) or when the value oo is assigned as the limit of
a raising function. So the general schema becomes:
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I ^m _ ftrle only a E M such that 9ft t= φ[a]
' ~~ (0 otherwise
(where '0' names a particular individual in M).
Certainly we should explain why, after all, the conventions contained in
high school textbooks are not too arbitrary. But even if we succeed, cf. Sec-
tion 4.2 of [12], the problem lies elsewhere. It derives from the possibility that
0 is the value not only for any improper \xδ9 but also for some proper δ', so that
\xδ = \xδ' and therefore δ <-> δ'. The latter, albeit counterintuitive, becomes con-
ventionally true. When L has tools for codifying its own syntax, the story is the
same for Frege's idea of giving the expression itself \xδ as value to any im-
proper δ. As is well known, there is another fregean option, but it falls just inside
the next trend to be considered: the external domain solution.
This is an approach which postulates a plurality of domains attached to
each L-model, in order to accomplish denotations for improper | -terms. The
way out is simply to restrict the range of quantifiers to a subdomain of the range
for free variables, considering the 'internal* subdomain D for quantifiers as con-
sisting in the actual, existing, elements; and the 'external' one (ones: D' ,D",...)
as consisting in the possible, nonexisting, elements, finally taking the union of
all these D\ D"', etc. as the ontological ambient. Such a step leads to new
choices. For instance, a decision must be made between: (i) letting \xa = \xβ
be true on the grounds of Vx(a <-> β), by taking the internal domain alone seri-
ously, or (ii) requiring the equivalence of a and β on the union of all the do-
mains, a(x) <-• β(x), in order to get \xa = \xβ.
A lot of variations can be made on such a theme even if their explanatory
power is minimal, and which, moreover, complicate standard semantics in ways
which have no connection with the practice of mathematicians, physical scien-
tists, and researchers in (natural or artificial) language theory. At any rate, we
could simplify the variety of /^enlargements' to two coupled domains, contain-
ing actual and possible elements (relatively to the given model). With this modal
intuition in mind one can imagine how many treatments come to hand, by
explicit introduction of different types of quantifiers (as in Nino Cocchiarella's
original proposal) Vβ,3β and VP93P, ranging over the two domains and giving
rise to four classes of descriptions, respectively with prefixes 3aVa,3pVa,3aVp,
3PVP, where only the first prefix coincides with the usual 3!.
At this point one is naturally led to consider a field of research where the
simultaneous presence of multiple domains has been extensively studied: it is the
so-called possible-world semantics for modal logic, often associated with Saul
Kripke's contributions. Here the presence in L of propositional operators like
D (it is necessary that) and 0 (it is possible that) leads to an investigation of
several kinds of descriptions: 3xVyΠφ, 3xΠvyφ,.... New problems soon arise
with identity (essential to the uniqueness clause for |-terms). In the standard
treatment, already in a 'poor' system like T one has x = y -> D (x — y) as a the-
orem, while x Φ y -> D (x Φ y) is obtained in the much stronger S5 — see [8] for
notation and proofs. This results in a hard life for descriptions in modal con-
texts. Moreover, let us think of the two paradigmatic cases, fusion (F) or bifur-
cation (B) of \xoί and \xβ in the passage from a possible world m to an m'
^-accessible to m in a given frame-model K:
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(F) m N \xa Φ \xβ, mRm', m' V \xa = \xβ
(B) m N \XOL = \xβy mRm', m' Y\xa Φ \xβ.
In the physical world we are acquainted with both (F) and (B) cases, while their
common treatment is formally puzzling in modal logic. The problem is how to
interpret this situation. As an indetermination of logico-linguistic practice or a
fundamental inadequacy of modal logic? There is a highly debated semantic
topic related to this problem: the de dicto/de re dichotomy. (Roughly, "de dicto"
is an occurrence of a modal operator when it is applied to a closed formula, "de
re" when applied to an open formula. So, to ΏV.xa there is a corresponding
de dicto | -term, to 3!xΏa. a de re \ -term, resulting in distinct identifiability con-
ditions, related to the difference between "the actual x such that in every alter-
native it continues to be 'the such and such'" and "the only x, possibly varying,
which in each alternative is 'such and such'".) The foregoing implies a reiden-
tification of individuals through possible worlds: a topic of high interest to psy-
chology and artificial intelligence, welcome by many, on the contrary, as the
horse of Troy for a metaphysics of a neo-medieval type. But here I must skip
a detailed discussion of such aspects, with which I am presently dealing in
another paper, "Lost modal horizon".
Thus I now leave the intrigue of modalities. However interesting the out-
come of a modal framework is for analyzing (contingently improper) descrip-
tions, one wonders whether the transition to a modal expansion L of L could
solve the original problem for L, unless one assumes that the same notion of
existence requires explicit modal distinctions. Instead I wish just to point out two
reinterpretations of modal expressions in classical model theory: first, one can
assimilate K to Mod(T), reading R as C or < or <
n
, and properly translating
the standard Kripke style conditions for D and 0; or one can assimilate K to
Aut
Ά
(yjl), Wl E Mod(T), reading R as any 9W-automorphism fixed on A c
2ft—an 'internal' interpretation of modal logic. I think greater explanatory power
can be obtained from these 'concrete' determinations of the modalities than if
they were to be approached in a general (and generic) way.
More than in modal semantics, TD has received extensive attention in free
logic. Here one can find a class of formal systems to which pertain both "inclu-
sive" logics (for empty domains) and logics with terms which do not presuppose
a denotation. As to inclusivity, in 1948 Andrej Mostowski showed that the impli-
cation from x = x to 3x(x = x) proves false if one puts a simple restriction on
variables: modus ponens must be applied only when free variables in the
premises remain free in the conclusion. In this way we are able to have empty
models. Finally, logic seems to have become the theory of really universal truths.
As to existential presuppositions, many authors (Karel Lambert, Jaakko Hin-
tikka, Bas Van Fraassen, Ermanno Bencivenga, among others) have tried to
develop logic without necessarily denoting terms (see [2]). This aim has been pur-
sued in many syntactical approaches originating from two main kinds of seman-
tics, respectively grounded on the so-called supervaluations and the substitutional
interpretation of quantifiers.
In fact, free logic embodies the option of constraining the use of quantifica-
tional axioms to terms which have been independently proven 'to exist', leav-
ing the language to nondenoting terms open. Resulting models may give rise to
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truth-value gaps: if t does not refer to any element in A, then φ(t) has no value
on 21. This strategy plainly extends to | -terms. With the supervaluation method,
one should recognize that classical bivalent models (without gaps) are related to
an ideal knowing (in this case modeling) subject. However natural, this trend
has encountered many problems. For instance, let us take an equation such as
t — t'\ it comes out not-true if t or t' does not refer, therefore one is led to adopt
identities such as t = t as conventionally true, which is certainly not in the spirit
of a well-designed logic. With regard to the substitutional interpretation of V
and 3 (especially advocated by Hughes Leblanc) as ranging over linguistic sym-
bols, so that a set of sentences which includes 3lxφ and -ιφ(#),-ιφ(Z?),. . . , is
not inconsistent in this framework even if it is not satisfiable (as in standard
semantics), I confine myself to observe that such a change in the concepts of
model and truth may be a step in the direction of an intralinguistic logic, but
if logic has to be applied to scientific (or, at least, mathematical) theories, the
problems of TD remain unexplained. That is, typically, the destiny of awkward
analytical tricks. But a more general question persists: the prerequisite of exis-
tence can never be satisfied in pure free logic, so it is somewhat vacuous intralin-
guistically. If, on the other hand, we have a theory T and T V φ(t) for a
certain /, Γ-axioms have to play an essential role, so the prerequisite is rather
superfluous. From this perspective, free logic seems to be just an appendix to
conventionalism.
However, these arguments would not hold up if the existence clause for t
were to be interpreted in another, mathematically relevant, fashion, as I am
going to explain.
I have already spoken about the external domain approach, but I shall now
discuss it in relation to the system presented in 1967 by Scott in [16]. I have left
the discussion of Scott's system to the end of this section because its peculiar fea-
tures give it the chance of becoming the basis of a much more general and useful
tool, as may be seen in Section 4.
Scott has one type of quantifier ranging over a subset A of the domain B
of interpretation (for free variables). The clauses for V and 3 are:
33 1= ivφ iff there is an a G A such that 23 1= φ[a]
23 |= Wφ iff for any a G A 23 1= φ[a].
All terms which do not refer to 'actuals' in the standard subdomain A are now
sent on *: * is the totally undefined individual. So the global domain for 23
becomes A U {*}. Scott admits -*3y(y = \xφ) -» \xφ = * as a first |-axiom.
Consequently, when neither φ nor -ιφ are uniquely satisfied, * = \z(z Φ z).
Now Scott expands the language with a new "existence" predicate E, which
means "belongs to A". So E{t) <-• 3v(v — t). Quantificational axioms become
(as in 'free' style) Vfφ Λ E(t) -> φ(t) and φ(t) Λ E(t) -» 3vφ. Finally, as a usual
second | -axiom, we have vy[y = \xφ <-• Vx(x = y <-> Φ(x))]. The outcome is a
very elegant treatment for descriptions, since changes within the classical frame-
work of standard semantics are minimal, while it synthesizes penetrating intu-
itions of different origins (Frege, Russell, and Quine). What seems to be not
completely successful in Scott's TD is the collapse on * of all the improper
descriptions relative to a given model.
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3 Model-theoretic algebra The aim of the following project is to bring
adepts of so-called philosophical logic to realize that we can get a lot of infor-
mation on descriptions without explicitly naming them, and moreover without
changing the standard framework, for applying a vast and conceptually rich
stock of results in classical model theory to TD. Here I limit myself to elemen-
tary logic, but this is by no means compulsory: one may certainly have some
pleasant surprises with descriptions in infinitary or higher-order languages. From
the model-theoretic point of view, what is interesting in a description of some-
thing by φ is simply the character of existence and uniqueness for φ and the
degree of invariance of 'the described'. So I shall deal first with the problems
of preserving descriptions in the sense of preserving the associated 3!-clause.
I have already observed the dependence of descriptions on "background
knowledge", for simplicity's sake identified here with a pair <7",93?> of a theory
and one of its models; you can see that when T is complete the preservation
problem is solved on the spot: however one treats | -terms, each of them is either
always or never proper. This highly improbable case could be called the Hilbert-
Bernays paradise. However, it does not provide information on another prob-
lem: the degree of rigidity of the SDΐ-element which is the denotation of \xφ.
When Γis model-complete and TV 3lxφ, perhaps a Γ-model 21 is such that
211= 3 Ixφ; then we are certain not only that, for any 33 D 21, S3 f= 3 Ixφ, but also
that the 'extension' of φ will be kept fixed: it is always the same a E A to be
described by φ in all such 33's, just because they are elementary extensions of 2ί.
This kind of situation occurs more 'locally', when T is not model-complete,
within the class G of generic Γ-structures —Robinson's infinitary model-theoretic
forcing, where conditions are replaced by diagrams of Γ-models.
Even from so few observations, one can appreciate the possibility of a
phenomenological study of the relation between the form of Γ-axioms and the
form of the descriptions to be preserved: a typical classification problem to
which the well-known prenex normal form theorem for classical logic offers the
tools for a solution — obviously it is not a viable approach if one uses intuitionis-
tic logic.
So one can start from existentially closed Γ-models and inductive Γ's, limit-
ing one's attention to the basic complexity level of Σ2-descriptions, see [12],
chapter 7, and then proceed to investigate more particular and/or complex
classes of formulas. One of the most direct cases occurs when φ is primitive posi-
tive, because 3\xφ becomes a Horn-sentence, and, as such, it is preserved under
reduced products of models and finite intersections of submodels.
But the most interesting aspect of the model-theoretic approach to TD
reveals itself when, again following Robinson, we look more strictly at the
generalization of concepts and constructions from algebra, in connection with
bringing back the set of Γ-definable elements in 9JΪ to a particular case of the
set of those 9Qΐ-members corresponding to τ?-valent formulas (i.e., formulas
satisfied by a finite number n of elements in M), which Lolli [11] has called
"quasi-descriptions". Their relevance is remarkable when φ is primitive, with
parameters extracted from a fixed subset A of dom(3Dΐ) so that elements satis-
fying such formulas are rightly named "algebraic" for their direct analogy with
roots for systems of equations (and disequations) taking coefficients from a
given subset of the domain (take for example the use of integral coefficients).
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Thus, it is not difficult to understand the meaning of the following result for
TD: when restricted to universal theories with the amalgamation property, the
notion of an algebraic element is equivalent to another provided by B. Jόnsson:
b is algebraic on A in 2ft iff for any 2? D 2ft such that/4: A(b) ~ N , we have
n
V (b = Ci), for C/G9?.
Another line of research is related to Γ-polynomial models, a notion again
defined by Robinson [14] and intended to generalize the algebraically closed
structures for particular theories. His analysis of pre-polynomials (with a unique-
ness condition instead of finiteness) is a starting point for the study of the A-
definable subsets in 2ft, and in particular of the descriptive closure of A, del (A),
as an extreme case of the algebraic closure, acl(A)— note that A is d-closed
when A = del (A). These properties have been investigated and refined by Shelah
[18], Lascar [10], and Poizat [13], emphasizing the group-theoretic aspects asso-
ciated with AutA (2ft) and AutA (2Ϊ), when 2ft < 5ft. By pursuing this theme one
reaches a classification of M-elements, relative to A and L(T), in rational
('describable'), algebraic, transcendent elements. This is a task which is also
strictly related to the idea of recovering Galois-correspondences out of field the-
ory, and in fact Poizat has proved the famous Galois Theorem on algebraically
closed fields, with logical methods supplied by the approach under discussion.
How could one say that this is not relevant to the parallel problem, taken from
semantics for natural languages, which has to do with descriptions of ideal "fic-
titious entities"? Here the contrast can be stressed between the present approach
and the more diffused one, for which the main purpose of TD ends up by giv-
ing a purely formal treatment of improper descriptions, for the simple reason
that, when terms are 'properly' defined, there is no problem. Up to now, the
analytic trend has led to a jungle of ad hoc systems based on axioms, rules, and
semantics, constructed for managing a large range of (improper) descriptions
in a uniform way. My idea is totally different: we are not searching for a univer-
sal melting pot in which to melt any possible context for a description, we are
simply focusing on a typical scientific situation in which, given a theory Γand
an intended model 2ft, we want to know if and why certain kinds of descriptions
can remain proper through a change from 2ft to 2ft' in Mod(T) or from Γto
T'. With this perspective in mind, we can appeal, and give methodological mean-
ing, to such a vast and rich interplay between the classical tradition of algebra
and contemporary model theory, in order to reach a 'soft' TD, ready to be
applied as a predictive tool. It is a line of thought which does not prevent any
previously formal attempts in TD from showing their heuristic value here and
there.
In a more concrete manner, I advance the following schema as explanatory
for the use of descriptions: one starts from L = L(T) and L-terms such as \xφ
which have been introduced on the basis of the ability to prove 3 \xφ from T-
axioms. Then one looks at a Γ-model 21 (which may be its only relevant model)
and enriches L(T), taking into account those 'virtual' entities which work to
solve problems in T relatively to 2l-parameters. Here is the creative function of
descriptions, but at the same time a tension between the attitude to restrict or
open the range of quantifiers can be perceived. Thus one proceeds to consider
different structures 2Γ related through certain maps to 21, and theories T' which
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possibly extend T9 are individuated through information from 2ί and are such
that T V 3 Ixψ while T \f 3 Ixψ. And so on, with 2Γ, Γ", in analogous relation
to 2Γ, 7". But there are also inverse cases where one is led from consequences,
derivable from 3 Ixφ, to exclude certain 'slices' of previous models as 'unreal'
parts. Combine the two roles of descriptions and you have an image of our onto-
logical back and forth. There is no one moment at which we are, once and for
all, given all possible terms: language develops with knowledge, and vice versa.
Bootstrapping? Yes, but neither too much, nor conventionally. What breaks the
vicious circle is the dynamic aspect of our constructive process and the stabil-
ity we gain for model- and theory-variation.
4 Categories of sheaves Today, the most advanced framework for TD
comes from category theory, and more specifically from topos theory. It is in
this context that Scott further developed his proposal in connection with sheaves,
together with Fourman (see [5] and [17]). This leads to the notion of "potential
elements" as particular partial functions. The main reason for suggesting this
radical shift from all other approaches cultivated within set-theoretic semantics
is to be found in the combination of two features: (1) the abandonment of clas-
sical logic as the basis for TD and (2) the interference between the analysis of
partially defined functions on a space, and the categorial interpretation of terms
as arrows ranging in Sub (I): the class of subobjects of the terminal object, viz.,
the class of monomorphisms (up to equivalence) with codomain the 'unique'
object b such that, for any object a in the given category, there is exactly one
arrow from a to b. In the case of sets, 1 is just any singleton.
In order to fix these ideas, it is useful to go back to the paradigmatic exam-
ple. Suppose that/and g are two local sections of A -^>I, considered as a fi-
ber bundle, i.e., two partial injective functions from I to A such that p f(i) =
i and p-g(j) =j\ for ij belonging to their respective domains included in /. As
a measure of the degree at which "/ — g" is true (where ~ is the linguistic coun-
terpart of =) one can take the subset of all those / E /where/and g receive the
same values:
E/«S! = {«:/(/) =g(0).
Note that if one thinks of p as a bundle, in the topos Set/I the pair (I, id/)
(where id
r
 is the identity function on /; see [6] for details) acts as a terminal
object, so [[/— g] looks like a truth-value (see Figure 1).
In the case of A -^>X, where A and X are topological spaces, and p is a
local homeomorphism, [/«#]] will have to be an open subset, so one takes
the interior:
U™gl =ixeX:f(x)=g(x)}°.
While in the universe of sets, such/'s and g's form only a pre-sheaf, the local
sections of p on a space X form a sheaf, i.e., they are in a precise sense "com-
patible". The class of all sheaves on X is a category, and more: a Grothendieck
topos.
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Figure 1.
The concept of existence, which remains mathematically vague in free
logics, here receives a clear counterpart:
\E(fM = tt/~/I =dom(/)
so the degree of existence for a partial / is measured by the size of its domain
of definition. Observe the inverted perspective: you do not enlarge a basic
domain, you separate in it and not arbitrarily.
One can now introduce an equivalence relation s weaker than «, by put-
ting I / s g\ = - (dom(/) U dom(g)) U [/« gj . The definiens can be trans-
formed in terms of the pseudocomplement =» in order to have a direct
generalization to the intuitionistic-topological case. The idea is that | / s g l
measures the degree at which both/and g are undefined or equal: lE(f)^ U
[ϋXg)] => [/« g j . As a consequence "/ — / " m a Y be only locally true while
[ [ / « / I is always equal to / (or X) which here counts as True'. Quantification
is analogously affected in quinean 'mood', and through glueing functions on
overlapping domains you get \xφ(x) definable as (J / \ lvx(φ(x) <->/« x)I.
/
It is important, at this point, to remember the possibility of generalizing all this
from a topology Θ(X) to any complete Heyting algebra Ω. The fruitfulness of
such a shift will not emerge until a parallel generalization is reached from the
set-theoretical background (the category Set of sets and functions) of our seman-
tics and the related classical hypotheses, to which Scott's early TD is tied. Let
us briefly present the essential steps in this new direction.
Any element x of a set A can be defined as an arrow from 1 = {0} to A,
where " 1 " is our standard name for the terminal object of a category. So, when
you leave Set for other topoi, the elements of an object a are arrows defined on
1, but: (i) 1 may now be very complex, (ii) we get the possibility of dealing
directly with partial elements as arrows defined on subobjects of 1, or with even
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more generalized Γ-elements of a as arrows from a parameters-object Γto a.
Here I shall however confine myself to the previous option, i.e., / partial means
dom(/) = u >-» 1.
When Scott passed from A to A = A U {*} he could also pass from the
partial functions g associated with | -terms to global ones, because now, once a
formula y(x) has been specified, there is a g: 1 -• A which corresponds to that
element x G A such that {x} = y% or to *. But this is only a particular case of
a general procedure. Given/: D-* B with D C A (that is, /is partial from A to
B9 because 3x G A such that x £ dom(/)) we could introduce a new entity *,
with * £ B, letting/(x) = * for any x £ dom(/). To avoid * G B, when B varies
through sets, the trick consists simply in replacing B with an isomorphic copy
(in Set, in bijective correspondence) B' = {{y} :y G B], taking * = 0 in order
to be certain that *£B'. Then B = Bf U {0). At this point we define f:A-+
B in the following way:
f(γΛ _ f /M, i f*E£> = dom(/)
n }
 ~ ( 0 , otherwise.
So /is derived in a unique way from/, and from a situation like
£> c >,4
/
B
we get a (universally) commμting square, i.e.,
D c >A
^ f where ηB(y) = {y}, for any y e B.
ψ Ψ
B > B
Once again, this procedure is a particular case within a more general one which
pertains to topoi, and is summarized in the "Partial Arrows Classifier Theorem"
(proved by William Lawvere and Michael Tierney) which states that in any topos
E, given an E-object b there is a b and an ηb: b -* 5 such that for all arrows /
from a subobject d of a there is exactly one/which makes the diagram
d > >a
» s *
5
a pullback.
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When a = 1, we obtain an object b of partial elements, in the sense that
the partial (potential) elements of b have become total (actual) elements of b.
Look at the heraclitean move: the opposition between potential and actual is rel-
ative to the topos, because if u >-> 1 is partial in E it is global in E/i* (and vice
versa).
Syntactically, L-constants are sent on partial elements. For a term t, an E-
model 21 based on a verifies E(t), equivalently 3v(v = t), when tn is a totally de-
fined entity 1 -> #, a global section in the topos of sheaves on a complete Heyting
algebra Ω. Quantificational axioms are accordingly modified, adding the prem-
ise E{t), and descriptions are introduced through the | -axiom (Scott's format):
vy[(y& \xΦW)++vx(Φ{x)++y&x)].
This strategy is ready to be applied to higher-order languages. Such an exten-
sion is due again to Fourman and Scott (see [5]). Andre Boileau and Andre Joyal
propose a different conception but acknowledge that there is a direct transla-
tion of Fourman's system into their own. The way a semantical interpretation
can be assigned to | -terms in this categorial framework is sketched in Section
11.9 of [6].
I only wish to add some general remarks on those points which seem to me
methodologically important in the categorial approach to TD, and to pose some
open questions for the further development of this approach.
(1) In topos models one can appreciate the opportunities offered by the
presence of nontrivial 'empty' domains (objects without global elements).
(2) Topos logic is generally intuitionistic, and from this point of view the
property of a certain subdomain (that of the actual entities) to be inhabited or
empty is no longer an alternative assertible in any case; and this also affects
eliminability conditions (see Section 20 of [9]).
(3) The local character of descriptive activity, which emerges with sheaves,
could receive further substantial support from the tradition of algebraic geom-
etry (germs, 'points', etc.), especially when seen in the light of the problems
encountered in semantics for natural language (Richard Montague's intensional
logic, Jon Barwise and John Perry's "situations", etc.). The possibility of better
fine tuning control of the case in which / and g are undefined at a 'point' / is
still to be explored; in the spirit of Section 3, the collapse of/on g should be
avoided, thus further reducing the import of conventional ingredients.
(4) A central feature of this new conception of TD is the variability in the
status of I -terms from topos to topos. For example, in M-Set (objects: actions
of a monoid M on sets, arrows: equivariant maps) only rigid descriptions are
possible, because all M-elements of A are fixed with respect to M-action.
(5) If the previous points are clearly related to traditional problems of TD
from the viewpoint of external semantics on a topos, that quickly growing sub-
ject known as categorial logic is a rich source of new interesting problems for
the model-theoretic approach presented in Section 3, when looked at 'internally'.
Geometric morphisms between topoi do not guarantee the preservation of
Σ2-sentences of the form 3lxφ even when φ is 'coherent', but they certainly
do if we consider descriptions as geometric theories of the (sequential) form
{φ(x) Λ φ(y) => x = y, T => 3xφx}. There is much relevant work for TD to do
in the direction of internal semantics.
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Now, topoi allow one to deal uniformly with the problem of a generalized
TD for extensions of (free) higher-order intuitionistic logic right up to the clas-
sical type theory (without ramification). But, at least up to the present time, cat-
egory theory provides adequate semantic tools only for distributive logics,
containing the law a A (β v 7) <-> (α Λ β) v (α Λ 7), while a categorial treatment
for I -terms in the nondistributive case would also be desirable. As a major exam-
ple of nondistributive logic still lacking such categorial treatment we have quan-
tum logic. Dalla Chiara has made an interesting contribution to the development
of a quantum TD in [4]: here one of the problems is that a proper formulation
of clauses of existence and uniqueness for φ does not imply the individuation of
a particular element d such that \xφ is a 'name' for it.
In fact, we should not forget what is perhaps the basic aspect of 'describ-
ing': when you univocally identify something in an explicit way, you are recog-
nizing a stable singularity in the universe of discourse. Can the logic-sensitive
character of TD result from a variational process on a topological intuition? If
so, then as in the case of the proximity-spaces in Section 2 of [1] it could be con-
jectured that only deeper investigation on the borderline between logic and (dif-
ferential) topology will succeed in founding TD. This would also be an effective
test for the real epistemological content of the 'dynamics' of descriptions I gave
in Section 3 in the form of an explanatory schema. But now the same schema
might become the object of research in functorial terms.
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